ZEUS HANS MENDEZ
After months of protests and jockeying, Iraq has appointed a new Prime Minister.
Picture via brookings.com
Iraq has been mired in protests over the majority of the last year. Motivated by anti-Iranian sentiments, a severe crackdown on dissent by the government as well was unable to quell them. These protests were aimed at gaining structural reform in a state which is still emerging out of the horrors left behind by the ISIS. Today, the UN reports nearly 1.4 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 4.1 million in need of humanitarian aid and assistance in Iraq. The government of Abdul Mahdi largely ignored and suppressed the needs of the population in exchange for granting privileges to organizations with linkages to Iran. Such actions by the previous government motivated the anti-establishment protests which continued into the beginning of this year. In this context, the election of a leader, who was head of the intelligence community and apart from the mainstream Iraqi politics has given rise to immense optimism in the country.
Mustafa Al-Kadhimi was elected the new Prime Minister of Iraq in May of this year. While undoubtedly coming on the heels of a government that failed and resigned, his election to office has marked a definitive change for Iraqi politics, both domestically and abroad. Representing a different point of view in national politics, Kadhimi has shown promise in being able to navigate between the Sunnis, Shias, and the Kurds. A prominent intellectual in Iraq, he was vocal against the repression of Saddam Hussein as well, writing on governance policies and structural reform at the time. Many within the country thus view him as a turning point for Iraqi society. Others are still skeptical of the changes he will be able to bring about. But for his part, Kadhimi has already begun a process of reform in the country. One of his first steps after coming to power was to release those protestors imprisoned by the previous government and to promote a respected general to lead counter-terrorism operations, a move that can only be viewed as a tool of public appeasement.
The main cause of concern for the new government now is to bring the armed militias, who roam the streets of Iraq, under the government's control. Kadhimi has already submitted a brief government manifesto to the Iraqi parliament seeking to “impose the state’s prestige” over these armed groups. Currently, the Iraqi state has no accountability over many groups like Kataib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, among others. These groups find shelter under the Popular Mobilization Forces, an organization that is apparently under the Iraqi government but is in fact an Iranian tool for spreading influence. Operationality of the Popular Mobilization Forces poses an issue as the Mahdi government allowed it to grow and gain autonomy and influence without imposing any restraints. To this end, the government increased the PMF’s budget to nearly $2.16 billion in 2019. Kadhimi has already indicated that he seeks to rein in the influence and operationality of the PMF under his government. Building on this promise, he has already shut down Thar Allah, a pro-Iran militant group, responsible for killing many during the protests.
Interestingly, the new government enjoys the support of a majority of the Shia population in Iraq. The highest Shiite authority in the country, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani also expressed support for the protests and the new government. Sistani has already sought to reduce the Iranian and PMF’s influence on his own, causing a number of factions to defect from the PMF. Such policies and support for Kadhimi raise some very important questions. Iraq has for long been seen as the “backyard of Iran”, a term, he himself has been against. To what extent then would Iran allow Kadhimi to reduce its influence in the region and what challenges will it pose for the new government?
While the new government will thus undoubtedly face challenges from both its neighbor as well as dissenters internally, it has already attempted to do much more than previous administrations. In this regard, it is the first government since the fall of Saddam Hussein, that has effectively been able to mobilize support from both the Shiite and Kurdish factions in Iraqi politics. The Kurds were one of the first announce support for Kadhimi, largely due to promises he has already made. Kurdish officials have announced that the new government has agreed to once more provide the revenue share to the Kurdistan Regional Government, valued at around $400 million, which was halted by the Abdul Mahdi’s administration.
Kadhimi has thus initiated a very balanced approach to his political agenda, seeming to aim for appeasement within Iraq rather than with many external players. While the new PM has already met with members of the EU and NATO as well as representatives of the US, UK and Russia, it cannot be only viewed as a foreign policy strategy. It is true that this has been seen by many as being motivated by regional power-seeking goals, however, it has been adopted largely as a domestic tool. Navigating within a government and country that has become disillusioned by the government, Kadhimi has apparently taken on the role of restoring Iraq to its former glory, in "providing a solution and not adding to the crisis".
In conclusion, it would be important to note that while Kadhimi may have heightened optimism within Iraqi society with his policies and support, he would not have been the first to do so. Previous administrations as well have come to power making promises of such magnitude, however, they have either failed under Iranian pressures or internal unrest. Kadhimi has already come under immense pressure in the past month, with demands by the public to start delivering on the many promises he has made. Now only time will tell whether the new Prime Minister will be able to succeed where previous administrations have failed, and rebuild the country as he promised.
The views expressed and suggestions made in the articles are solely of the authors in their personal capacity and the Center for Middle East Studies and O.P. Jindal Global University do not endorse the same.
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